Source guide

Making the Case That China Has Taken Some Steps to Influence the Presidential Election

A heavily redacted 16 October 2020 National Intelligence Council alternative-analysis memorandum compares a minority assessment that Beijing had taken low-level steps to influence the 2020 presidential election with the Intelligence Community’s mainline judgment that it had not deployed efforts intended to change the outcome.

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01

Alternative assessment

The NIO for Cyber and the Director for Election Threat Analysis assessed that Beijing had taken low-level, exploratory steps to hurt the President’s reelection prospects through denigration and shaping voter perceptions. The memorandum expressly says this differed from the IC judgment that Beijing had considered, but not deployed, election-influence efforts.

“Beijing has taken at least some low-level, exploratory steps to undermine the President’s reelection chances by denigrating him and shaping voter perceptions.”
Alternative-analysis key judgment
Source: page 1 ↗
02

Methods and confidence

The authors said the activity probably included overt messaging, nascent covert online capabilities, diplomacy, and economic leverage, while probably excluding Beijing’s most aggressive options. They assigned low-to-medium confidence to these assessments.

“Beijing’s efforts probably have included overt messaging, nascent online covert influence capabilities, diplomatic measures, and the use of economic leverage.”
Alternative-analysis supporting judgment
Source: page 1 ↗
“The NIO and D/ETA have low-to-medium confidence in these assessments”
Confidence statement
Source: page 1 ↗
03

Mainline IC judgment

The mainline IC assessment was that Beijing had not deployed influence efforts intended to alter the election result; it emphasized Chinese leaders’ desire for stability and their ability to pursue objectives regardless of the winner.

“The IC, including the NIO for East Asia and other NIC officers, assesses Beijing has not deployed influence efforts intended to change the outcome of the US Presidential election.”
IC mainline judgment
Source: page 1 ↗
04

Indicators and attribution limits

The minority analysis treated private-sector, open-source, and other reporting as indicators that some influence activity was underway. It also acknowledged that a discussed pro-China social-media network could not be directly tied to the Chinese government, limiting the strength of attribution.

“private sector and open source reporting on influence activities already underway suggest that the Chinese Government has been engaging in at least some level of influence”
Alternative-analysis assessment
Source: page 3 ↗
“Although we cannot directly tie this network to the Chinese Government”
Attribution caveat
Source: page 4 ↗
05

No reporting of aggressive election interference

The authors said reporting did not show China using more aggressive measures such as large political donations, compromising voting infrastructure, or interfering with mail-in ballots. This limits the memorandum’s claim to influence activity rather than demonstrated technical interference with voting systems.

“there is no reporting to suggest that China has engaged in some of the more aggressive measures available to it to influence the US election outcome, such as funneling large donations or trying to compromise voting infrastructure or interfere with mail-in ballots.”
Tempering assessment
Source: page 6 ↗