Source guide

Summary of Assessed Chinese Influence and Cyber-Operation Plans, Part 3

A one-page continuation of a summary about alleged Chinese influence and cyber plans ahead of the 2020 presidential election focuses on gun proliferation and immigration-related themes.

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01

Repeated overarching assessment

This part repeats—rather than independently corroborates—the assertion that Chinese plans were designed to exploit perceived or real U.S. fissures and vulnerabilities to influence audiences and government decision-making. The page supplies no underlying sourcing, and one descriptor of the potential operations is redacted.

“The China plans were designed to exploit U.S. societal fissures and vulnerabilities, to influence U.S and other audiences, and by extension U.S. government decision-making.”
Repeated summary assessment
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02

Gun and immigration themes

The page identifies gun proliferation and immigration policies as additional themes within the alleged plans.

“Gun proliferation; and”
Listed influence theme
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“Immigration policies:”
Listed influence theme
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03

Specific immigration-related tactics

The summary lists inciting dissatisfaction among migrant communities, provoking demonstrations over alleged U.S. government human-rights violations against immigrants, inflaming conflict between pro- and anti-immigrant communities, and instigating anti-immigration demonstrations.

“Inciting migrant community dissatisfaction with the USG;”
Listed influence theme
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“Inflaming resentment between anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant communities; and”
Listed influence theme
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“Instigating anti-immigration demonstrations.”
Listed influence theme
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04

Repeated dissemination and collection claims

The page repeats the claim that China could distribute these themes through social and mainstream media using overt and hidden influencers or contributors. It also repeats an option to gather information on senior U.S. officials to affect public opinion of them; neither repetition constitutes separate corroboration.

“China had developed capabilities to project themes on these topics into social media (Tiktok, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and others), as well as mainstream media through a variety of overt and hidden influencers and media contributors.”
Repeated summary assessment
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“One of the options included gathering information on senior U.S. government officials to influence public opinion of those officials.”
Repeated summary assessment
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