Source guide

Summary of Assessed Chinese Influence and Cyber-Operation Plans, Part 2

A one-page continuation of a summary about alleged Chinese influence and cyber plans ahead of the 2020 presidential election focuses on racial tensions and other U.S. political and policy divisions.

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01

Repeated overarching assessment

This part repeats—rather than independently corroborates—the assertion that Chinese plans were intended to exploit U.S. social fissures and vulnerabilities to influence audiences and government decision-making. The page does not identify the underlying sources, and one descriptor for the potential operations is redacted.

“The China plans were designed to exploit U.S. societal fissures and vulnerabilities, to influence U.S and other audiences, and by extension U.S. government decision-making.”
Repeated summary assessment
Source: page 1 ↗
02

Racial-tension themes

The summary lists attempts to use demonstrations as evidence of racial division and to increase conflict between police and anti-racism activists. These are presented as planned themes in the summary, not independently demonstrated outcomes on the page.

“Inciting demonstrations and marches as evidence of racial divides;”
Listed influence theme
Source: page 1 ↗
“Increasing the level of conflict between police and anti-racism activists; and”
Listed influence theme
Source: page 1 ↗
03

Other listed divisions and policy themes

The page also lists political-party disagreements and conflict between Congress and the Trump administration, along with tensions involving the military, women’s rights, South China Sea policy, alleged U.S. war aspirations, and international propaganda.

“Political party disagreements;”
Listed influence theme
Source: page 1 ↗
“Congress-Trump Administration conflicts;”
Listed influence theme
Source: page 1 ↗
“U.S. South China Sea policies;”
Listed influence theme
Source: page 1 ↗
04

Repeated dissemination claim

The page repeats the claim that China could project such themes through social and mainstream media using overt and hidden influencers or contributors; this repetition is not separate corroboration.

“China had developed capabilities to project themes on these topics into social media (Tiktok, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and others), as well as mainstream media through a variety of overt and hidden influencers and media contributors.”
Repeated summary assessment
Source: page 1 ↗