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Foreign Threats to 2020 U.S. Federal Elections

A downgraded and heavily redacted National Intelligence Council assessment of foreign influence and election-infrastructure threats involving Russia, China, Iran, and other actors before the 2020 U.S. federal elections.

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01

Scope and overall concern

The assessment said its primary concern was ongoing and potential influence activity by Russia, China, and Iran, while also discussing possible attacks on election infrastructure. It expressly did not assess the effects of foreign influence on the United States and excluded activity the Intelligence Community could not attribute to foreign actors.

“We are primarily concerned about ongoing and potential influence activity by Russia, China, and Iran.”
Key takeaways
Source: page 1 ↗
“This paper does not make assessments about the impact of these efforts on the US.”
Scope note
Source: page 1 ↗
02

Russia assessment

Analysts assessed that Russia was using multiple measures mainly to disparage former Vice President Biden and the anti-Russia establishment as Moscow perceived it, including proxy dissemination of claims. The assessment also said some Kremlin-linked actors sought to promote President Trump's candidacy on social media and that Moscow's broader efforts aimed to amplify U.S. discord.

“We assess that Russia is using a range of measures primarily to denigrate former Vice President Biden and what it sees as an anti-Russia establishment.”
Key takeaway; analyst assessment
Source: page 1 ↗
“Some Kremlin-linked actors are also seeking to boost President Trump's candidacy on social media.”
Key takeaway; analyst assessment
Source: page 1 ↗
03

China assessment

Analysts assessed that China preferred President Trump not win reelection and had intensified public criticism of his administration that Beijing recognized could affect the election. Large redactions obscure important qualifiers and supporting intelligence, so the visible text does not justify a broader claim about the scale or operational details of Chinese activity.

“We assess that China prefers that the President—whom Beijing sees as unpredictable and tough on China—does not win reelection.”
China section; analyst assessment
Source: page 3 ↗
“in the past few months it has stepped up public rhetoric criticizing his Administration, which it recognizes may affect the election.”
Key takeaway; analyst assessment
Source: page 1 ↗
04

Election-infrastructure vulnerabilities and limits

The assessment judged that hostile actors could exploit Internet-connected voter-registration databases, pollbooks, and election-official websites because of their accessibility and comparatively weak security. It also judged localized manipulation of vote-counting systems possible, but a coordinated wide-scale alteration campaign difficult; audits and paper trails were expected to expose most such efforts.

“We assess that hostile actors could exploit Internet-connected election infrastructure—such as voter registration databases, pollbooks, and state or local election officials' websites—because of its ease of access and comparative lack of security.”
Threats to Election Infrastructure
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“it probably would be difficult to coordinate a campaign to alter voting results on a wide scale.”
Threats to Election Infrastructure; limiting judgment
Source: page 5 ↗
05

Iran and other actors

The assessment said Iran was conducting an influence campaign against the President and U.S. democratic institutions, but stated that it had no information showing an Iranian intent to attack U.S. election infrastructure. It separately assessed that criminal and other nonstate groups had the capability to compromise election systems, while noting that specific plans were unknown.

“Iran is conducting an influence campaign to undermine the current President and US democratic institutions, and to divide the country in advance of the 2020 elections.”
Iran section; analyst assessment
Source: page 5 ↗
“we do not have any information indicating that it intends to do so in the United States.”
Iran section; infrastructure-intent caveat
Source: page 6 ↗
“Criminal or other nonstate groups also have the capability to compromise US election infrastructure.”
Other Foreign Actors section
Source: page 7 ↗