A heavily redacted interagency email chain records the August–September 2020 coordination of an election-security graphic and differing analytic views about how to characterize China’s policy influence, candidate preference, and possible election interference.
The chain circulated the latest edition of an election-security graphic for interagency comments by 1 September, and the lead reply is dated 3 September 2020. Much of the routing information and several complete pages are redacted.
“Please see attached for the latest edition of our graphic”
“Please send comments to the cc line by COB Tuesday, 1 September.”
An INR participant argued that available evidence supported a judgment that China probably was not interfering and objected to conflating policy influence with election interference. Another participant said the team could not endorse a definitive statement that China was not trying to affect the outcome and requested a confidence caveat.
“we actually do possess positive evidence about China’s intent—and it suggests China probably is not interfering in the election.”
“China’s influence efforts to shift public opinion on particular policy issues are not the same as election interference”
“we can’t sign off on a definitive statement about this.”
INR characterized the then-current view among INR, CIA, NSA, and FBI as a relative consensus and suggested that a contrary NIC view be presented as a standalone dissent. The Election Threat Analysis director said the proposed edits were intended to add coordinated language and a caveat without changing the judgment, while leaving dissent as an option if coordination failed.
“there is relative consensus within the China-watching community (INR, CIA, NSA, FBI) about how to describe China’s activities.”
“We were hoping to avoid a dissent, hence this long email chain.”
“adding a caveat to a judgment but not changing it”
CIA-proposed language assessed that Beijing used lobbying, economic measures, information obtained through computer-network exploitation, and rhetoric to pressure U.S. officials and candidates, while stating that China was not then trying to favor one presidential candidate. The same proposed language said those capabilities could be used to influence the election if Beijing directed officials to do so and assessed that the risk of being caught probably outweighed potential gains.
“but at this time is not trying to influence the outcome of the presidential election in favor of one candidate or another.”
“which we assess could be used to influence the 2020 election if Beijing directed Chinese officials to do so.”
“China probably judges the risk of being caught interfering in the US election outweighs any potential gains.”
A proposed NIC note said observed China-based election narratives had been small, gained little traction, and were quickly removed by social-media companies; it made any escalation implication conditional on Beijing direction or sanction. CIA editorial notes said the referenced campaign was still being evaluated and that the available sources were not assessed as authoritative, so the material did not yet warrant inclusion in the lead judgment.
“the campaigns have been small in scale, gained little traction, and were promptly shut down by social media companies.”
“If these activities are directed or sanctioned by Beijing”
“we as an IC have not finished evaluating”
“none of which we assess are authoritative.”